‘Remote coercion’: What has US approach been since abduction of Maduro? 

It was an extraordinary beginning to the new year: A deadly United States military operation on Venezuelan soil. The abduction of the country’s longtime leader, Nicolas Maduro.

But in the three weeks since the operation, widely condemned as an affront to international law and a potential opening salvo in the administration of Donald Trump’s stated goal of “preeminence” in the Western Hemisphere, only a vague framework of Washington’s plan for the South American country has emerged.

Meanwhile, relative calm in Venezuela has overlaid deep-seated anxieties over what comes next, analysts told Al Jazeera. Faultlines in the country’s leadership remain active, with the situation subject to devolve based on how Trump and his top officials proceed.

Here’s where things stand, and what could come next.

Maduro has sat in prison in New York since the January 3 operation, awaiting trial on drug trafficking and so-called conspiracy to commit “narcoterrorism” charges.

But many of the circumstances leading up to his abduction have endured. A massive portion of the US’s military arsenal has remained deployed off the coast of Venezuela. A blockade on US-sanctioned oil tankers has stayed in place. The Trump administration has promised to continue strikes on alleged drug smuggling boats in the Caribbean, while not ruling out future Venezuela land operations.

“What we’re seeing is not a fully formed [US] strategy, but an evolving one,” Francesca Emanuele, a senior international policy associate at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, told Al Jazeera.

Trump initially promised to “run” Venezuela, while dousing the prospect of seeking to install an opposition-led government. He has continued to downplay the proposition of opposition involvement, following a meeting last week with Maria Corina Machado, instead focusing on coordinating with interim President and former Maduro deputy Delcy Rodriguez.

The president’s early manoeuvres, which have included his first direct call with Rodriguez and the deployment of his CIA director to Caracas, have unabashedly emphasised US oil access to the country.

In that, Trump has sought to establish a “control mechanism”, according to Begum Zorlu, a research fellow at City, University of London, that “depends on fear: sanctions, oil leverage, and the threat of renewed force”.

“What emerges is not governance but a strategy of remote coercion, forcing the post-Maduro leadership to comply with US demands, particularly around oil access.”

Or as Emmanuel put it: “The Venezuelan government is operating with a gun to its head, and that cannot be bracketed out of any serious analysis.”

Emphasis on oil

In that context, the administration has made some early moves to access Venezuelan oil. Just days after Maduro’s abduction, Washington and Caracas announced plans to export up to $2bn worth of crude stuck at Venezuelan ports due to the ongoing US blockade.

Last week, the US announced the first $500m sale of the resource, with Rodriguez saying Caracas had received $300m in proceeds. She said the funds would be used to “stabilise” the foreign exchange markets.

But Phil Gunson, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group focusing on the Andes Region, said the current scheme by which the US is acquiring and selling Venezuela’s oil remains opaque. Several questions – made the more pressing by a history of corruption and patronage in Venezuela – have gone unanswered.

US lawmakers, meanwhile, have demanded that Trump officials “immediately disclose any financial interests” they have in the companies involved.

“Selling the oil is the easy part,” he told Al Jazeera. “But who determines how that money is spent? How will the goods and services purchased be administered, by what criteria and under whose direction?”

Meanwhile, Trump’s vision of US companies accessing and exploiting Venezuela’s vast oil reserves has run into headwinds from market realities, even as Venezuela’s parliament has opened debate on amending a hydrocarbon law to allow more foreign investment in the country’s state-run oil industry.

Just six days after Maduro’s abduction, Trump invited 17 oil companies to the White House to discuss investments in Venezuela, which he promised would meet “at least 100 billion dollars”. But even among a friendly crowd, top industry leaders pointed to a list of major reforms needed before the country was seen as investable.

Trump, in turn, has pledged security for US companies operating in the country, including reportedly considering using private defence contractors. Little clarity has emerged.

The administration’s high-pressure approach to Venezuela, Zorlu explained, creates a “central contradiction: the coercive model designed to secure US control over Venezuelan oil may ultimately undermine the investment climate required to extract that oil at scale.”

How have Venezuela’s leaders responded?

In the streets of Caracas, the atmosphere has remained “tense but calm”, according to Crisis Group’s Gunson.

“There is an unusually active presence on the streets of the capital of colectivos,” Gunson said, referring to pro-government paramilitary groups often deployed to smother dissent, “and the elite DAE unit of military counter-intelligence (DGCIM), which appears to be intended to send a message that no political opening is contemplated, at least for now.”

“No one is on the streets either celebrating or protesting, and for the most part, people are in a ‘wait and see’ frame of mind.”

Meanwhile, there has been little in the way of public discourse from the “three power centres” that dominate Venezuela’s government, as Gunson described: The civilian flank of Rodriguez and her brother, president of the National Assembly Jorge Jesus Rodriguez; the military under Defence Minister Padrino Lopez; and Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, who controls the police and much of the intelligence apparatus, has influence in the army, and who “can also call on the colectivos”.

In their relatively staid response during the weeks since the US operation, “a government that is usually outspoken in denouncing US imperialism is clearly biting its tongue to avoid provoking Trump and [US Secretary of State] Rubio”, analyst Emanuele explained.

Rodriguez has shifted from early public – if performative – defiance to a more conciliatory tone towards the Trump administration. That has included a reshuffle that saw longtime Maduro ally and regular US target Alex Saab sacked as the minister of industry and national production.

Rodriguez has vocally supported plans to open the country’s oil industry to foreign investors, as her government has begun gradually releasing political prisoners arrested following an opposition crackdown in the wake of Maduro’s contested 2024 election victory claim.

The harshest condemnations of US actions have been left for other officials, including Cabello and Foreign Minister Yvan Gil, “though even those statements have been noticeably moderated”, Emanuele said.

As an example, she pointed to Trump’s claim that longtime ally Cuba would no longer receive oil or financial support from Venezuela. In response, Venezuela’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed its support for Havana, but avoided any direct reference to its future plans for oil.

“This suggests a calculated effort to preserve room for manoeuvre under US coercion,” Emanuele said.

“And it matters because this appears to be one of the conditions the Trump administration is attempting to impose on Venezuela as the price of continuing down a ‘negotiation’ track.”

What fault lines remain?

Analysts warned the early compliance seen among Venezuela’s leaders should not be seen as stability, particularly in a country where officials have for years relied on a sprawling system of patronage.

Gunson explained that the Rodriguez siblings “could be ousted at any point if the factions with the guns chose to do so”.

Notably, like Maduro, Padrino and Cabello remain under US indictment with a reward on their heads.

“For now, it is not in their interests, and they appear to be working in close coordination with the civilians,” he said. “That might change if their fundamental interests were threatened, especially in the event of an attempted political transition.”

“They have to be worried that the US could come back in to get them or that a political opening agreed with the Rodriguez siblings might lead to their prosecution either in Venezuela or in the US,” he said.

It remains impossible to gauge how deep the distrust runs in Caracas, although it has become a common suspicion that Maduro’s abduction required the cooperation of at least some members of his inner circle.

The Guardian news agency, citing four sources, reported on Thursday that Delcy Rodriguez had previously assured US officials she would cooperate in the event of Maduro’s ousting. The sources were adamant that Rodriguez “did not agree to actively help the US to topple” Maduro, the newspaper reported, and that the longtime leader’s abduction was not a pre-engineered coup.

The Reuters news agency also reported that US officials had been in contact with Cabello in the months preceding the operation, although it was unclear if they discussed future governance.

“We cannot clearly see the internal calculations among civilian leaders and the military, the fractures within the armed forces themselves, or where loyalties ultimately rest across the security apparatus,” researcher Zorlu said.

Beyond the possible faultlines between the civilian authorities and the security apparatus, she added, discord may also cut through “regime strategy”, and whether some in the government view US accommodations as an “existential threat”.

“The coming months are likely to reveal fractures that are not yet visible,” she said.